With an event as transformative and historically significant as the recent electoral unrest in Iran, it is only natural that many disparate elements of life and business are affected. The telecommunications industry is no exception. Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal published a provocative piece examining the control and censorship of the Internet by the Iranian government in an attempt to curtail protests. The crux of the piece is the government’s alleged use of deep packet inspection (DPI) technology acquired from Nokia Siemens Networks in this effort. It is a noble attempt to shed light on censorship and the impediments to free expression in countries such as Iran and China. And it is an unfortunate reminder that in the world of the Internet, true anonymity in personal correspondence or activity is largely a myth. The only problem with the piece is that it is largely inaccurate and misleading.
There are a few qualms that I’d like to get out of the way right off the bat:
- DPI is not what Nokia Siemens Networks actually provides.
- Nokia Siemens provided Iran with Lawful Intercept capabilities designed for voice communications, not DPI technology that is being used for censoring Internet traffic.
- Operators and governments worldwide engage in Lawful Intercept (often by regulatory mandate), which may or may not have DPI as a contributing technology. In the case of the technology that NSN provides, it is not.
- DPI does not allow for the altering of packet content, as the article suggests, to create disinformation campaigns.
- DPI does not have to be inserted directly into the data flow if it is just engaged in monitoring activities, and even when it is, it does not create a slowdown in network traffic that would be perceptible to a large public audience.
The list could go on.
The main point I would like to make though is that DPI is mischaracterized as a “practice” or an “activity”. DPI is a technology. What the article is describing is one potential, particularly malicious, usage of the technology. Yet many things that are potentially benign can also be potentially dangerous. Just because someone can use binoculars to invade another’s privacy does not mean that they cannot also be used for bird watching. To take a more extreme analogy, just because you can get behind the wheel of a car and run someone over does not mean that cars are inherently violent. The onus is on the user of the technology, rather than on the technology itself, and this is what the article misses. The culprits are not Nokia Siemens (leaving aside that NSN does not actually provide DPI technology) or their peers. The culprits are those that would use the technology for malicious purposes. In this case, the Iranian government.
What DPI does is what it says it does: packet inspection. It is a technology used to gain Layer 3 through Layer 7 packet visibility (from the network layer through the application layer) to determine the source, destination, application type, etc of network traffic. It does not read emails. It does not alter Internet content. It does not slow down the Internet. And, directly to the point about Iran, it does not intercept or block traffic. The Iranian government can choose to take action in these regards based on the intelligence about traffic flows that DPI can provide, but again, that is independent of the technology.
This is actually a more extreme (and more politically charged) example of what got Comcast into hot water last year with how it chose to use network information. For those unfamiliar with the case, Comcast raised the ire of public interest groups and the FCC for blocking BitTorrent traffic that it deemed to be overly burdensome on its network. The FCC deemed this inappropriate not because of how Comcast obtained traffic information (using DPI), but because of what it chose to do with that information. In a similar fashion, a number of operators in the US were chastized by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet for using DPI-acquired intelligence to do behavioral-based ad-targeting. This ultimately led to behavioral targeting vendor NebuAd getting dragged before Congress for a tongue-lashing, and ultimately folding in the face of public and legislative pressure. Again though, the issue was how the technology was used by NebuAd and its operator customers, not the technology itself.
The technology itself has a number of legitimate uses that are in line with the public good (and operator profits, for that matter), including security threat detection, threat mitigation, enhanced network management, enhanced quality of user experience, the ability to introduce new services, etc. Yankee Group has written a number of pieces on this issue in the past that examine how operators are using the technology today and what the potential opportunites are in the future. These often go unmentioned though when DPI is reported on, because they don’t arouse public debate the way that “Iran’s Web Spying Aided by Western Technology” does.
My goal here is not just to argue with the Wall Street Journal though (an argument I’m sure I would lose) or point out inaccuracies in the article. It is to underscore the consequences of misrepresenting something like this. In the past two years, DPI providers have run afoul of issues around privacy, net neutrality and now censorship, due to the ways in which customers have chosen to use the technology. These issues have attached a scarlet letter to a technology and companies that can provide legitimate value to operators and consumers, when used properly. Instead though, competitors have been forced to retreat from the market, the maturation of the technology has stalled, and operators have turned towards potentially less efficient solutions for network visibility, security and traffic management for fear of igniting a firestorm amongst those that would misconstrue their intentions.
It is a fine line to walk in regards to what is and is not acceptable in the world of traffic inspection, to be sure. But that’s all the more reason why the technology must be accurately understood and represented, rather than demonized off-hand.